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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
The state appeals from the district court's memorandum decision and 
order that granted Cadee Jo Peterson a new trial on the charge of conspiracy to 
manufacture, deliver or possess with intent to deliver a controlled substance. 
Statement of Facts and Course of Proceedings 
In September 2011, narcotics officers discovered through an extensive 
undercover investigation that Morgan Alley was manufacturing and selling 
Schedule I synthetic cannabinoids under the product label "Twizted Potpourri." 
(Tr., p.273, L.2-p.317, L.25, p.339, L.19- p.382, L.14, p.397, L.15 p.450, L.3, 
p.485, L.11 - p.634, L.2, p.1620, L.5 - p.1624, L.2, p.1641, L.24 - p.1673, L.20.) 
Alley manufactured the "Twizted Potpourri" in a privately rented warehouse on 
Lemhi Street in Boise (hereinafter the "Lemhi Street warehouse"). 1 (Tr., p.1107, 
L.10 - p.1109, L.7, p.1112, L.22 - p.1113, L.11.) Peterson and others worked 
for Alley in the Lemhi Street warehouse and packaged and labeled the finished 
product for wholesale and retail distribution. (Tr., p.624, L.3 - p.626, L.9, p.632, 
L.12 - p.633, L.13, p.1172, L.17 - p.1174, L.7, p.1178, L.17 - p.1181, L.2.) 
Among other locations, Alley and others sold "Twizted Potpourri" out of Alley's 
own retail business, the "Red Eye Hut," which, while advertised as a tobacco 
shop, bore all the hallmarks of a "head shop" catering to users of marijuana and 
1 The evidence at trial, including Alley's own testimony, showed that Alley 
manufactured "Twizted Potpourri" by infusing plant material with AM-2201 and 
other synthetic cannabinoids. (Tr., p.276, Ls.2-25, p.278, Ls.3-18, p.284, L.5 -
p.285, L.11, p.1212, L.16-p.1216, L.18; R., p.365.) 
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similar drugs. (Tr., p.267, L.25 - p.270, L.9, p.296, L.5 - p.299, L.3, p.302, L.2 -
p.316, L.6, p.630, L.6 - p.632, L.11, p.1125, L.9 - p.1126, L.3, p.1200, L.19 -
p.1204, L.7.) Although labeled "not for human consumption," the "Twizted 
Potpourri" Alley manufactured and sold was flavored with tobacco flavoring and 
was displayed in the "Red Eye Hut" in the same vicinity as glass pipes, bongs, 
other paraphernalia designed for ingestion of marijuana and synthetic 
equivalents. (Tr., p.287, L. 18 - p.289, L.17, p.296, L.5 - p.299, L.3, p.302, L.2 -
p.311, L.4.) 
On September 29, 2011, officers executed search warrants at the Lemhi 
Street warehouse, the "Red Eye Hut" and the Alley residence. (Tr., p.275, Ls.15-
23, p.581, L.17 - p.583, L.25.) During the searches officers found items 
associated with the manufacturing and delivery of material containing synthetic 
cannabinoids, as well as drug paraphernalia and the synthetic cannabinoids 
themselves. (Tr., p.275, L.15 - p.276, L.25, p.277, L.23 - p.283, L.13, p.835, 
L.6- p.841, L.12, p.955, L.23- p.965, L.17, p.975, L.25-p.1008, L.21, p.1334, 
L.6 - p.1415, L.22, p.1443, L.11 - p.1481, L.2, p.1655, L.8 - p.1680, L.22.) 
Peterson arrived at the Alley residence while officers were searching it. 
(Tr., p.599, Ls.10-24, p.842, Ls.16-21.) She was carrying a backpack that 
contained, among other things, a jar of "Twizted Potpourri" and a glass pipe with 
residue. (Tr., pp.842, L.25 - p.845, L.22.) When questioned by police, Peterson 
said she became friends with Alley's wife in April 2011 and began working for 
Alley in September 2011. (Tr., p.624, Ls.3-8, p.626, Ls.10-16.) Peterson knew 
when Alley offered her a job that she would be "working with Potpourri, but she 
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didn't know exactly what she would be doing." (Tr., p.624, Ls.8-11.) Peterson 
said that, when she walked into the Lemhi Street warehouse on her first day of 
the job, there "was Potpourri everywhere. It was in containers. It was in 
Tupperware. It was in boxes. Some was packaged; some wasn't packaged." 
(Tr., p.624, Ls.12-22.) She said Alley told her "that her job was to weigh the 
Potpourri material at one gram, place the one gram of material into the container, 
affix the lid onto the container, and affix the appropriate sticker onto the lid, then 
place the fully assembled container of Twizted Potpourri into an identifying box." 
(Tr., p.624, L.23 - p.625, L.6.) Peterson described the packaging process as 
"sort of an assembly line. So one person would be weighing the material, one 
person would be placing it into the container, one person affixing a lid and one 
person placing a sticker on the lids." (Tr., p.625, L.20 - p.626, L.2.) Peterson 
worked at the Lemhi Street warehouse for three to five hours a day for 
approximately nine days and earned $9.00 per hour. (Tr., p.626, Ls.4-9.) 
Peterson admitted that, "'[d]espite the warnings on the label saying it's not for 
human consumption,"' she was "well aware that [Twizted Potpourri] is intended 
to be smoked. She also said that she has smoked Spice or synthetic 
cannabinoids in the past" but "denied that she has ever smoked Twizted 
Potpourri." (Tr., p.627, Ls.4-18.) Peterson indicated she was told by Alley that 
"Twizted Potpourri" was legal. (Tr., p.752, Ls.1-7; see also Tr., p.1172, L.17 -
p.1174, L.7 (Alley's testimony that he told his employees what they were doing -
packaging "Twizted Potpourri" for distribution - was "completely legal"), p.1284, 
Ls.13-17 (same).) 
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A grand jury indicted Peterson for conspiracy to manufacture, deliver or 
possess with intent to deliver tetrahydrocannabinols and/or synthetic equivalents 
(hereinafter collectively referred to as "synthetic cannabinoids"). (R., pp.25-28.) 
Peterson's case was consolidated with those of her co-defendants for purposes 
of trial. (R., pp.29-30.) Peterson's defense at trial was, essentially, that she did 
not know "Twizted Potpourri" contained synthetic cannabinoids and believed, 
based on Alley's representations to her, that it was legal. (Tr., p.750, L.3 -
p.752, L.6, p.1281, L.5 - p.1285, L.2, p.1288, L.23 - p.1290, L.1, p.1859, L.7-
p.1871, L.8.) At the conclusion of the evidence, Peterson requested and 
received a jury instruction on mistake of fact. 2 (R., p.257; Tr., p.1859, L.7 -
p.1871, L.15, p.1919, L.17 - p.1921, L.4.) At the state's request, the court also 
instructed the jury that ignorance or mistake of law was not a defense, as 
follows: "When the evidence shows that a person voluntarily did that which the 
law declares to be a crime, it is no defense that the person did not know that the 
act was unlawful or that the person believed it to be lawful." (R., p.258; Tr., 
p.1856, L.23 - p.1860, L.2; see also Tr., pp.48-87 (hearing on state's motion in 
2 Specifically, the mistake of fact instruction provided: 
For a defendant to be guilty of conspiracy, the state must 
prove the defendant had a particular intent. Evidence was offered 
that at the time of the alleged offense the defendant mistakenly 
believe [sic] certain facts. You should consider such evidence in 
determining whether the defendant had the required intent. 
If from all the evidence you have a reasonable doubt 
whether the defendant had such intent, you must find the 
defendant not guilty. 
(R., p.257.) 
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limine to preclude evidence of mistake of law and instruct jury that mistake of law 
not a defense).) Following deliberations, the jury found Peterson guilty of the 
charged conspiracy. (R., p.288.) 
Peterson moved for a judgment of acquittal or, in the alternative, for a new 
trial. (R., pp.289-92, 294-313.) As the basis for her motion for a new trial, 
Peterson argued the trial court erred in instructing the jury that ignorance or 
mistake of law was not a defense to conspiracy. (R., pp.296-304, 332-41.) The 
trial court denied Peterson's motion for judgment of acquittal but granted her 
motion for a new trial. (R., pp.364-72.) The court agreed with Peterson that 
"intent to violate the law" is an essential element of a conspiracy charge and, as 
such, concluded that the giving of the mistake of law instruction was erroneous 
and that "[t]he jury should have been instructed [instead] that a good faith belief 
that the object crime was not illegal is a defense to conspiracy." (R., pp.369-72.) 
Having reached this conclusion, the court determined that Peterson was "entitled 
to a new trial in the interest of justice on the sole count in the indictment, 
[conspiracy] to manufacture, deliver, or possess with intent to deliver a controlled 
substance." (R., p.372.) The state timely appealed. (R., pp.377-84.) 
5 
ISSUE 
Did the district court err in concluding that ignorance of the law is a 
defense to conspiracy to manufacture, deliver or possess with intent to deliver a 
controlled substance and, thus, abuse its discretion in granting Peterson's 
motion for a new trial? 
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ARGUMENT 
The District Court Abused Its Discretion In Granting Peterson's 
Motion For A New Trial 
A Introduction 
The district court granted Peterson a new trial based on its conclusion that 
it had misdirected the jury on a matter of law. Specifically, the court concluded it 
should not have instructed the jury that ignorance or mistake of law was not a 
defense to the conspiracy charge because, the court found, "intent to violate the 
law" is an element of conspiracy. (R., pp.369-72.) The district court erred. 
While conspiracy is a specific intent crime, the intent required is only that to 
agree to perform some act that is illegal; knowledge of the illegality of the agreed 
upon act or intent to violate the law are not elements of conspiracy. Thus, even 
if the jury believed Peterson did not know the synthetic cannabinoids she agreed 
to manufacture, deliver or possess with intent to deliver were illegal, Peterson's 
ignorance or mistake of law was not a defense to the charged conspiracy.3 
B. Standard Of Review 
Idaho law permits a new trial if the court misdirected the jury on a matter 
of law. I.C. § 19-2406(5). The decision to grant or deny a motion for a new trial 
is reviewed for an abuse of discretion. State v. Jones, 127 Idaho 478, 481, 903 
3 To the extent Peterson claimed she did not know the "Twizted Potpourri" she 
agreed to manufacture, deliver or possess with intent to deliver contained 
synthetic cannabinoids, such was a claimed mistake of fact that, by virtue of the 
guilty verdict, was necessarily rejected by the jury. (See R., p.257 Uury 
instruction on mistake of fact).) 
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P.2d 67, 70 (1995); State v. Eddins, 142 Idaho 143, 145, 128 P.3d 960, 962 (Ct. 
App. 2006). 
In this case, Peterson's motion for a new trial turned upon the propriety of 
a jury instruction. Whether a jury was properly instructed is a question of law 
over which the appellate court exercises free review. State v. Draper, 151 Idaho 
576, 587-88, 261 P.3d 853, 864-65 (2011) (citing State v. Humphreys, 134 Idaho 
657, 659, 8 P.3d 652, 654 (2000)). 
C. Ignorance Of The Law Is Not A Defense To Conspiracy To Manufacture, 
Deliver Or Possess With Intent To Deliver A Controlled Substance 
It is a "deeply rooted" principle of American legal jurisprudence that 
"ignorance of the law or a mistake of the law is no defense to criminal 
prosecution." Cheek v. United States, 498 U.S. 192, 199 (1991 ); see also State 
v. Fox, 124 Idaho 924,926,866 P.2d 181,183 (1993) ("Ignorance of the law is 
not a defense." (Citations omitted)). An exception to this rule exists in limited 
circumstances when the claimed mistake "negatives the existence of a mental 
state essential to the crime charged." 1 Wayne R. LaFave, Substantive Criminal 
Law, § 5.6(a) (2d ed. 2012) (footnote omitted). But unless a criminal statute 
contains "specific language to the contrary, ignorance of the law is not a defense 
to a charge of its violation." Morgan v. Hale, 584 P.2d 512, 517 (Cal. 1978), 
quoted in Fox, 124 Idaho at 926, 866 P.2d at 183; see also United States v. 
Ansaldi, 372 F.3d 118, 128 (2d Cir. 2004) (unless crime requires proof of 
knowledge of law, "prosecution need not show that a defendant knew the 
illegality of the conduct with which he is charged"); United States v. Blair, 54 F.3d 
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639, 643 (10th Cir. 1995) (absent a clear statutory directive to the contrary, even 
specific intent crimes "do not, as a rule, necessitate a showing the defendant 
intentionally violated a known legal duty"). 
Consistent with the general rule that ignorance or mistake of the law is not 
a defense, the district court gave the following instruction at Peterson's trial for 
conspiring to manufacture, deliver or possess with intent to deliver synthetic 
cannabinoids: 
When the evidence shows that a person voluntarily did that 
which the law declares to be a crime, it is no defense that the 
person did not know that the act was unlawful or that the person 
believed it to be lawful. 
(R., p.258.4) After the jury found Peterson guilty, and in response to Peterson's 
motion for a new trial, the district court reconsidered its decision to give the 
foregoing instruction. (R., pp.369-72.) Relying on cases from other jurisdictions, 
but without examining the language of the conspiracy statutes under which 
Peterson was charged, the court determined "intent to violate the law" was an 
essential element of the charged conspiracy. (Id.) Because there was evidence 
presented at trial from which the jury could have concluded Peterson lacked 
what the court deemed to be "the necessary intent to violate the law so as to be 
guilty of conspiracy even though the acts [s]he agreed to perform constituted the 
underlying crime," the court concluded "[t]he jury should have been instructed 
that a good faith belief that the object crime was not illegal is a defense to 
conspiracy." (R., p.372.) The court erred. A plain reading of the statutory 
language under which Peterson was charged shows that "intent to violate the 
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law" and/or knowledge of the illegality of the agreed upon act(s) are not elements 
of conspiracy under Idaho law. 
The state charged Peterson under both the general conspiracy statute, 
I.C. § 18-1701, and the conspiracy provision of the Uniform Controlled 
Substances Act, I.C. § 37-2732(f). (R., p.25.) Pursuant to I.C. § 18-1701, a 
general criminal conspiracy is defined as follows: 
If two (2) or more persons combine or conspire to commit 
any crime or offense prescribed by the laws of the state of Idaho, 
and one (1) or more of such persons does any act to effect the 
object of the combination or conspiracy, each shall be punishable 
upon conviction in the same manner and to the same extent as is 
provided under the laws of the state of Idaho for the punishment of 
the crime or offenses that each combined to commit. 
The conspiracy provision of the Uniform Controlled Substances Act similarly 
provides: 
If two (2) or more persons conspire to commit any offense 
defined in [the Uniform Controlled Substances] act, said persons 
shall be punishable by a fine or imprisonment, or both, which may 
not exceed the maximum punishment prescribed for the offense, 
the commission of which was the object of the conspiracy. 
I.C. § 37-2732(f). 
Pursuant to the plain language of these statutes, a person is guilty of 
conspiracy if he or she conspires with another to commit an illegal act and at 
least one of the conspirators does some act in furtherance of the illegal 
4 The cited jury instruction is a verbatim recitation of ICJI 1511. 
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objective.5 Consistent with this plain reading of the statutes, the Idaho Court of 
Appeals has repeatedly stated that a conspiracy under Idaho law consists of 
three essential elements: "(1) the existence of an agreement to accomplish an 
illegal objective, (2) coupled with one or more overt acts in furtherance of the 
illegal purpose and (3) the requisite intent necessary to commit the underlying 
substantive offense." State v. Gamble, 146 Idaho 331, 337, 193 P.3d 878, 884 
(Ct. App. 2008) (citing State v. Munhall, 118 Idaho 602, 606, 798 P.2d 61, 65 
(Ct. App. 1990)); accord State v. Tankovich, 2013 WL 3467056 *3 (Idaho App., 
July 23, 2013) (petition for review pending); State v. Rolon, 146 Idaho 684, 690, 
201 P.3d 657, 663 (Ct. App. 2008); State v. Lopez, 140 Idaho 197, 199, 90 P.3d 
1279, 1281 (Ct. App. 2004); State v. Martin, 113 Idaho 461,466,745 P.2d 1082, 
1087 (Ct. App. 1987). See also ICJI 1101 (intent element of conspiracy is "that 
the crime would be committed" (bracketed language omitted).) While the state 
must prove as an element of a conspiracy charge that the defendant had the 
requisite intent to commit the underlying offense, nowhere in the conspiracy 
statutes or in the case law interpreting them is there any requirement that the 
state also prove the defendant intended to violate the law or knew of the illegality 
of the agreed upon act. In other words, knowledge of or intent to violate the law 
is simply not an element of conspiracy under Idaho law. 
5 There is no language in I.C. § 37-2732(f) requiring an act in furtherance of a 
conspiracy to commit an offense proscribed by the Uniform Controlled 
Substances Act. Nevertheless, because the state also charged Peterson under 
I.C. § 18-1701, it is undisputed that an act in furtherance was an element of the 
conspiracy as charged. 
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Rather than examining the plain language of the charging statutes, the 
district court determined that proof of intent to violate the law was a necessary 
requisite to Peterson's conviction because conspiracy is a specific intent crime. 
(R., pp.369-72.) The state acknowledges the Idaho Court of Appeals' statement 
in two recent cases that "it is generally accepted that conspiracy is a specific 
intent crime." Tankovich, 2013 WL 3467056 at *3; Rolon, 146 Idaho at 691, 201 
P.3d at 664. Contrary to the district court's determination, however, the fact that 
conspiracy is a specific intent crime does not lead inexorably to the conclusion 
that the specific intent required is an intent to violate the law. See Blair, 54 F.3d 
at 643 (quoting United States v. Scanio, 900 F.2d 485, 489 (2d Cir. 1990) ("[A] 
specific intent crime 'normally does not necessitate proof that the defendant was 
specifically aware of the law penalizing his conduct."'). 
As explained by the Court of Appeals in Rolon, the specific intent required 
for a conspiracy conviction is "the intent to agree or conspire and the intent to 
commit the offense which is the object of the conspiracy." Rolon, 146 Idaho at 
691, 201 P.3d at 664 (emphasis original); accord Tankovich, 2013 WL 3457056 
at *3. It is beyond cavil that one can intend to commit a substantive criminal 
offense without also intending to violate the law. See, !:Llh, Fox, 124 Idaho at 
926, 866 P.2d at 183 (intent required for possession of controlled substance is 
only "the knowledge that one is in possession of the substance"). And, as set 
forth above, intent to violate the law is not a statutory element of the crime of 
conspiracy. It therefore follows - and other courts interpreting similar conspiracy 
statutes have held - that unless the offense that is the object of the agreement 
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itself requires a showing of intent to violate the law, the state need not prove 
such intent in order to prove a conspiracy. 
For example, in United States v. Feola, 420 U.S. 671, 686 (1975), the 
Supreme Court of the United States rejected Feola's argument that, on a charge 
of conspiracy to assault federal officers in the performance of their duties, the 
prosecution was required to "show a degree of criminal intent ... greater than is 
necessary to convict for the substantive offense." Like Idaho's conspiracy 
statutes, the federal statute at issue in Feola provided in relevant part that a 
criminal conspiracy is committed when "two or more persons conspire . . . to 
commit any offense against the United States, . . . and one or more of such 
persons do any act to effect the object of the conspiracy." Feola, 420 U.S. at 
687 n.20 (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 371)). Upon examination of that statute, the 
Supreme Court found "no textual support for the proposition that to be guilty of 
conspiracy a defendant in effect must have know that his conduct violated 
federal law." kL_ at 687. The Court reasoned: 
The statute makes it unlawful simply to 'conspire ... to commit any 
offense against the United States.' A natural reading of these 
words would be that since one can violate a criminal statute simply 
by engaging in the forbidden conduct, a conspiracy to commit that 
offense is nothing more than an agreement to engage in the 
prohibited acts. 
kL_ (ellipses original). The Court also pointed to its prior decisions in In re Coy, 
127 U.S. 731 (1888), and United States v. Freed, 401 U.S. 601 (1971), noting 
that in both cases the Court "declined to require a greater degree of intent for 
conspiratorial responsibility than for responsibility for the underlying substantive 
offense." Feola, 420 U.S. at 687-88. 
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Both before and after Feola was decided, numerous courts in other 
jurisdictions have similarly held that, absent an express statutory directive to the 
contrary, the intent required to sustain a conspiracy conviction is that required for 
commission of the underlying substantive crime. See, ~. United States v. 
Davis, 690 F.3d 330, 340 (5th Cir. 2012) (on charge of conspiracy to commit 
illegal gambling, government was required to prove same degree of criminal 
intent as required for proof of underlying substantive offense); United States v. 
Baker, 63 F.3d 1478, 1493 (9th Cir. 1995) (where substantive offenses did not 
require proof of intent to violate the law, defendants could be guilty of conspiring 
to commit substantive offenses even if they were not aware their actions were 
illegal); Blair, 54 F.3d at 643 ("prosecution need not prove a defendant 
intentionally violates a known legal duty in order to sustain a conviction under 
[general federal conspiracy statute] in cases where the underlying substantive 
offense does not impose such a requirement"); United States v. Scotto, 641 F.2d 
4 7, 55-56 (2d Cir. 1980) (finding "no reason to believe ... from the words of the 
statute or from general criminal law doctrine, that the quantum of mens rea 
required for a RICO conspiracy should be different from or greater than that 
required for a substantive RICO offense"); People v. McLaughlin, 245 P.2d 1076 
(Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1952) ("The guilt of those who conspire to do an act which is 
prohibited by law is measured by their intent with reference to the act to be 
performed and not by the amount of their knowledge or ignorance of whether 
such acts are contrary to statute."). 
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Like the conspiracy statutes at issue in the above-cited cases, the statutes 
under which Peterson was charged offer "no textual support" for the district 
court's conclusion that "intent to violate the law" is a necessary element of 
conspiracy. As in Feola, the statutes at issue in this case make it unlawful 
simply to "conspire to commit any crime or offense prescribed by the laws" of this 
state, I.C. § 18-1701, or, alternatively to "conspire to commit any offense defined 
in" the Uniform Controlled Substances Act, I.C. § 37-2732(f). Also as in Feola, 
"[a] natural reading of these words would be that since one can violate a criminal 
statute simply by engaging in the forbidden conduct, a conspiracy to commit that 
offense is nothing more than an agreement to engage in the prohibited act." 
Feola, 420 U.S. at 687. Accordingly, as in Feola and the other cases cited, the 
state need not prove an intent to violate the law to sustain a conspiracy 
conviction, unless such intent is required for commission of the underlying 
substantive crime. Because the Uniform Controlled Substance Act violation that 
was the object of the charged conspiracy in this case did not require knowledge 
of the illegality or intent to violate the law, see I.C. § 37-2732(a); Fox, 124 Idaho 
at 926, 866 P.2d 183, Peterson was guilty of conspiracy merely by having the 
specific intent to commit the proscribed acts (i.e., the manufacture, delivery or 
possession with intent to deliver synthetic cannabinoids), regardless of her 
knowledge or lack thereof that the acts were illegal. 
Idaho's conspiracy statutes, by their plain language, do not require as an 
element either knowledge that the object of the conspiracy is illegal or intent to 
violate the law. Nor does the crime that was the object of the conspiracy in this 
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case require knowledge that it was proscribed by law. Because neither the 
conspiracy statutes nor the substantive criminal statute under which Peterson 
was charged require any specific intent to violate the law, Peterson's alleged 
ignorance or mistake of law was not a defense to the charged conspiracy. The 
trial court thus erred by granting Peterson a new trial to allow a jury to consider 
this nonexistent defense. 
CONCLUSION 
The state respectfully requests that this Court reverse the district court's 
order granting Peterson's motion for a new trial and remand the case for further 
proceedings. 
DATED this 28th day of August 2013. 
Deputy Attorne~eneral 
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